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Carbon Sequestration and Permit Trading on the Competitive Fringe 
 
Abstract 
This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration policy literature. First 
and foremost, we develop a theoretical framework in which sequestration and permit-
trading markets are analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. Our 
framework formalizes the linkage between regulatory policy changes (as they manifest 
themselves in the permit market) and subsequent equilibrium allocations in the 
sequestration market. Second, we perform a numerical analysis demonstrating the role 
market structure, or market power, might play in the determination of the equilibrium 
sequestration allocation and carbon price. Both our analytical and numerical results 
demonstrate the importance of incorporating into empirical supply-side models demand-
side information that is reflective of an underlying market structure. 
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1. Introduction 
The main focus of carbon sequestration research has thus far been the empirical 
estimation of supply functions, both for specific countries and globally.1 Although the 
supply estimates themselves vary, the general opinion emerging from this literature is 
that scope exists for cost-effective policies fostering both the curtailment of deforestation 
and promotion of reforestation in support of carbon sequestration at national, regional, 
and international levels.2 What has not yet been considered in this analysis, however, is 
the role that market structure, or market power, might play in the determination of an 
equilibrium sequestration allocation. This paper is a first attempt at characterizing the 
role of market structure in the context of a carbon sequestration model that also 
incorporates an existing permit-trading market, and is thus in keeping with the multi-
instrument policies promulgated in recent international climate-change agreements 
spurred by the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998). 
A similar issue was faced roughly 20 years ago with respect to permit trading, when 
Hahn’s (1984) seminal article demonstrated the importance of market power in 
determining an equilibrium outcome. Hahn’s principle result was that if a single firm 
with market power purchases(sells) permits in an otherwise competitive market it will 
behave as a monopsonist(monopolist). Thus, the degree of market inefficiency is 
systematically related to the initial distribution of the permits. Since then, permit-trading 
research has attempted to quantify the extent to which monopoly and monopsony power 
                                                
1 With respect to country-specific studies, see Stavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006) for the US, Xu 
(1995) for China, Fearnside (1995) for Brazil, Ravindranath and Somashekhar (1995) for India, de Jong, et 
al. (2000) for Mexico, and Sedjo (1999) for Argentina. See Benitez, et al. (2007) and Sohngen and Sedjo 
(2004) for estimates of global supply.  
2 Reforestation is not the only form that carbon sequestration can conceivably take.  Alternatives include 
agricultural sequestration in soils and geological sequestration in mature oil fields, coal beds, or deep saline 
aquifers (Lal, 2004; U.S.DOE, 2009). 
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influence the trading equilibrium, most notably in the field of experimental economics 
using auction-type environments.3 Contrary to these earlier works, which assume the 
existence of monopoly and monopsony power, we develop a competitive fringe model of 
carbon sequestration in the presence of permit trading. The presumption of a competitive 
fringe is premised on two strands of the sequestration literature – the first strand is 
empirical, the second theoretical. 
With respect to the empirical literature, Benitez, et al. (2007) estimate global 
sequestration supply curves for afforestation and reforestation activities based on highly 
disaggregated (grid-level) physical data with country-level controls for political, 
financial, and economic risks. They find that low-cost sequestration sites are mainly 
located in regions of the developing world, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern 
Brazil, and Southeast Asia.4 This suggests inter alia that national-level findings, most 
notably those of Stavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006), must be tempered by the fact 
that domestic sequestration policies are likely to co-exist, be supplemented by, or be pre-
empted by international or regional agreements to combat climate change.  As a result of 
global comparative advantages, such as those identified by Benitez, et al. (2007), the 
equilibrium that emerges in a regional or global sequestration market may be governed 
more by the interplay of a dominant firm (or nation or region) and a competitive fringe 
than by perfect competition within a given nation. 
                                                
3 See Muller, et al. (2002) and Godby (2000) for examples of this strand of the experimental literature. 
4 Sohngen and Sedjo’s (2004) numerical analysis of global sequestration potential is not as sanguine about 
the extent of these regional comparative advantages.  Nevertheless, recent sequestration projects sponsored 
by the United Nations and World Bank involving both governmental agencies and non-governmental 
organizations (including cooperatives consisting of individual landholders) in Sub-Saharan and East Africa, 
Central and Latin America, and Southeast Asia suggest the potential for the developing world’s 
comparative advantage in sequestration, especially when the indirect benefits of poverty alleviation are 
accounted for (Jindal, et al., 2008;  UNFAO, 2004; Jindal, et al., 2011). 
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It is of course possible that a global market for sequestration would resemble more an 
oligopoly than a competitive fringe; a possibility that might increase as alternative forms 
of sequestration (e.g., soil and geological as discussed in Lal (2004) and U.S.DOE 
(2009)) are legitimized through future international policy. However, as Asheim, et al. 
(2006) point out, there are fairly general conditions under which multiple regional 
agreements (that internalize global externalities such as climate change) outperform a 
single global agreement. In particular, the authors find that a regime with two agreements 
can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty, implying that regional 
cooperation might be a good alternative – or supplement – to a global environmental 
agreement. In a world governed by such regional agreements, oligopolies may be less 
likely to form. Instead, regional sequestration agreements may feature dominant countries 
with relatively large sequestration supplies interacting with competitive fringes of 
countries with relatively small supplies. 
Consider, for example, a regional agreement between the US and Brazil. Brazil, for 
its part, could potentially act as a dominant firm due to its relatively low marginal costs 
of sequestration (associated with existing reforestation opportunities on vast tracts of 
public land (Benitez, et al., 2007)). US farmers would in turn act as a competitive fringe 
due to their relatively high marginal costs of sequestration (associated with existing 
opportunity costs for alternative private land uses (Lubowski, et al., 2006)). In turn, 
international trading in sequestered carbon might complement an existing domestic 
permit-trading market in the US that includes the nation’s largest industrial polluters. 
Acknowledging the fact that different market structures may in fact arise as 
sequestration gains greater international recognition as a tradable carbon sink, we develop 
 5 
in this paper a theory of a competitive sequestration fringe in conjunction with an existing 
permit trading market (for abatement by polluters). We then demonstrate through 
numerical analysis the responsiveness of equilibrium sequestration to changes in the 
relative cost structures of the dominant firm and competitive fringe, as well to stricter 
regulatory policy in the permit market. With respect to the latter case, we find that 
increases in polluting firms’ required abatement levels induce higher sequestration levels 
from the dominant firm and the competitive fringe, as well as from the low-cost polluter. 
The equilibrium carbon price rises in tandem with these changes. 
We begin our analysis in Section 2 with a graphical exposition of the competitive 
fringe model in the presence of permit trading. Section 3 develops a mathematical 
framework and numerical model, which is then solved for an initial set of parameter 
values and for subsequent changes in the relative cost structures embodied by these 
parameters, as well as for changes in regulatory standards.  The results of the numerical 
analysis are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Graphical Analysis of the Joint Competitive Fringe – Permit Trading Model 
This section presents a simple graphical analysis of sequestration and permit trading in 
the context of a competitive fringe model. As a point of departure, consider the standard 
textbook model of the competitive fringe depicted in Figure 1.5 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In this figure, residual demand for the dominant firm’s output, Dr, is the horizontal 
difference between market demand, D, and the aggregate supply of the (competitive) 
fringe firms, Sf = MCf (the kink in Dr occurs precisely at the vertical intercept of Sf). The 
                                                
5 This particular model is adopted from Carlton and Perloff (2004). 
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dominant firm maximizes profit at point d, by setting a price of p* and selling *dq units 
(where MRr intersects MCr).  The competitive fringe therefore produces *fq at point f and 
market equilibrium occurs at point e, with price p* and total quantity *** df qqQ += . 
Incorporating permit trading into this model (for ease of exposition only two polluters 
cum traders are needed) adds corresponding kinks to the dominant firm’s residual 
demand curve. This expanded model is depicted in Figure 2.6 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
In Figure 2, the Dr curve has kinks at prices pf (the vertical intercept of the 
competitive fringe’s aggregate supply curve Sf) and p1 (the vertical intercept of polluter 
p1’s permit supply curve Sp1). Here, the dominant firm maximizes profit at point e by 
setting a price of p* and selling *dq units of sequestered carbon. The competitive fringe 
therefore produces *fq  of sequestration at point d and polluter p1 offers 
*
1pq abatement 
credits for sale at point f (via abatement beyond its statutorily required amount). Because 
the equilibrium price p* lies beneath the vertical intercept of its permit supply curve, 
polluter p2 chooses not to supply a positive amount of abatement credits to the market.7 
Market equilibrium occurs at point g, with price p* and total quantity sequestered 
***
1
*
dfp qqqQ ++= . 
                                                
6 Restricting attention to the bilateral trading behavior of any given two polluters follows the standard 
graphical approach (e.g., Tietenberg, 2006 and Kolstad, 2011), which illustrates the essential features of a 
competitive pollution market. The mathematical model presented in Section 4 formally accounts for n 
polluters. 
7 Note that the vertical intercept of Dr occurs at price p2, which in turn is the vertical intercept of polluter 
p2’s permit supply curve Sp2. The coincidence of these two vertical intercepts is consistent with the fact that 
for carbon prices above p2 polluter p2 also becomes a net supplier of abatement credits. With both polluters 
p1 and p2 now being net suppliers, market demand for sequestration is effectively negative, i.e., for prices 
above p2 the Dr curve extends into the second quadrant of the Cartesian coordinate system. 
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Figure 2 brings to light a complication in the sequestration/permit trading model that 
is absent from the basic model depicted in Figure 1. In Figure 1, closure (via equating 
market demand and supply) is not really an issue. This is because the demand and supply 
sides of the market are separate, i.e., those demanding the good are not also supplying it, 
and vice versa. This is not the case in the sequestration/permit-trading model. 
Recall from Figure 2 that polluter p1 is a net supplier of abatement credits, and both 
the competitive fringe and dominant firm are also suppliers of credits (in the form of 
sequestration).8  Because it is explicitly included in the model, polluter p2 must therefore 
consume the total amount of credits produced for sale, Q*.  This explains the positioning 
of polluter p2’s permit supply curve. The equilibrium price p* is consistent with polluter 
p2 effectively supplying a negative amount of abatement credits for sale (i.e., demanding 
a positive number of credits). In specific, polluter p2’s demand for credits must equal the 
total amount of credits offered for sale by the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and 
polluter p1, i.e., Q*. 
We now turn to theoretical and numerical analyses based on a full accounting of the 
model’s components. In particular, we explicitly close the model with a market-clearing 
condition that is premised on statutorily required abatement levels for each polluter. 
 
3. Theoretical and Numerical Models   
As indicated in Section 2, the competitive fringe model of carbon sequestration and 
permit trading has three different types of agents/industries: (i) a dominant firm, (ii) a 
permit-trading market comprised of polluting firms, and (iii) a competitive fringe.  We 
begin this section with a general analytical treatment of sequestration and permit trading, 
                                                
8 We henceforth use the terms “credits” and “sequestration” synonymously. 
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which then guides the development of a numerical model to assess the responsiveness of 
sequestration to changes in the relative cost structures of the dominant firm and 
competitive fringe, as well as to changes in regulatory standards. 
Heuristically, we can think of the three types of agents as participating in a two-stage 
game that converges to a long-run, subgame-perfect equilibrium. In the first stage, the 
dominant firm chooses its sequestration level based on its conjecture of the aggregate 
sequestration demand function, which in a deterministic setting is consistent with the 
assumption of perfect foresight. As stated in Section 2, this demand is “residual” in the 
sense that the dominant firm incorporates the competitive fringe’s sequestration supply, 
as well as any net supply from the polluters themselves, in its determination of how much 
sequestration to produce (and, effectively, of which carbon price to set). 
In the second stage, the polluting firms and competitive fringe take the carbon price 
as given and choose their respective abatement and sequestration levels.9 In conjunction 
with their statutorily required levels of abatement, the polluting firms’ actual abatement 
levels determine their respective abatement-credit (or sequestration) demands (which 
could be negative for some firms, in which case the firms are net sequestration suppliers). 
A subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained in the long-run when three conditions are met: 
(i) the dominant firm’s conjectures are realized, (ii) the dominant firm’s and competitive 
fringe’s aggregate sequestration (along with any net sequestration supplied by the 
polluters themselves) equates with sequestration demand, and (iii) the fringe firms each 
obtain zero profit (and thus the fringe in aggregate obtains zero profit).  
                                                
9 We assume price-taking polluters in order to retain a focus on the effects of a competitive fringe in the 
sequestration market. Imperfectly competitive permit trading is the focus of a growing literature. See Hahn 
(1984) and Liski and Montero (2006) for examples.  In Section 4 we simplify the model by including only 
two polluters, and without loss of generality assume that these two polluters behave competitively.    
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Since a subgame perfect equilibrium is solved via backward induction, we begin by 
characterizing the polluting firms’ and competitive fringe’s respective second-stage 
problems.10 Polluter i, who participates in a competitive permit-trading market, chooses 
its quantity of abatement, piq~ , to solve the following cost-minimization problem, 
( ) ( )Min
piq pi pi pi pi
c q p q q− −% % % ,  i= 1,....,I 
where cpi is polluter i’s total abatement cost (assumed positive and convex in piq~ ), piq  is 
polluter i’s statutorily required level of abatement ( p piiq q=∑ ), and p is the per-unit 
carbon price, which polluter i takes as given, i = 1,....I.11 
The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for this problem are,12 
pic pʹ′ ≤ ,  i = 1,....I 
which result in the polluters’ implicit abatement functions, 
( )* 0pi piq q p= ≥% % ,  i = 1,....,I 
which in turn define the corresponding permit demand functions, 
( )* *,pi pi pi pi piq q p q q q= = −%,  i = 1,....,I.      (1) 
                                                
10 Although the sequential nature of solving for a subgame-perfect equilibrium is dynamic in the sense of 
agents moving from one stage in the decision-making process to the next, the model we present is static in 
terms of generating time paths for the quantity and price variables. While a dynamic framework, e.g., 
expected net-present value maximization in the presence of  laws of motion for the price and regulatory 
variables, would add to the model’s realism, it would also detract from the main focus of the analysis, 
which is to provide a simple framework within which to assess the interactions between sequestration and 
permit markets. We therefore leave construction of a dynamic version of this model to future research.   
11 Variables preceding the parentheses are functions of the variables and parameters included within the 
parentheses.  Note that this problem can equivalently be expressed in terms of the polluting firm’s choice of 
emissions rather than its abatement level. We have chosen the latter merely for expositional convenience. 
Also for convenience, we assume that verifying the transferability of the polluters’ abatement is costless 
due to pre-existing monitoring by the regulatory authorities. 
12 picʹ′ represents the first partial derivative of function c with respect to piq~ . 
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Polluters with 0* >piq ( 0
* <piq ) are permit demanders (suppliers). Curvature 
conditions on cpi ensure that the polluting firms’ problems are concave, which in turn 
ensure standard comparative static results, i.e., non-upward(-downward)  sloping permit 
demand(supply) functions. For future reference, let * *p piiq q=∑% % refer to aggregate 
abatement by the polluting firms and * *p piiq q=∑  refer to aggregate net permit demand. 
With respect to the competitive fringe, representative firm j chooses its quantity of 
carbon sequestration, qfj, to solve the profit-maximization problem, 
( )Max ;
fjq fj fj f fj fj fj
= pq c q Fπ θ− − ,  j = 1,....,J 
where cf is firm j’s sequestration total cost (assumed positive and convex in qfj), and Ffj  is 
a one-time, quasi-fixed licensing fee verifying the transferability of firm j’s sequestered 
carbon 𝐹! = 𝐹!"! .13 Explicit cost parameters θfj are included to account for structural 
cost changes that are assessed through numerical analysis in Section 4.14 In specific, we 
assume fcʹ′  (i.e., the fringe firm’s marginal cost) increases in θfj, and, similar to polluter i, 
fringe firm j takes p as given in its problem. Thus, an increase in parameter θfj reflects a 
structural change in fringe firm j’s costs such that fcʹ′ increases for all qfj. 
The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for this problem are, 
fc pʹ′ ≥ ,  j = 1,....,J 
which result in the fringe firms’ sequestration supply functions, 
                                                
13 We acknowledge that verification of sequestration is itself an important issue, which is addressed in the 
environmental- monitoring and climate-policy literatures (Ney, et al., 2005; Subak, 2002). Exploring this 
issue here is beyond the scope of this study. 
14 Similar parameters could also be included in the polluters’ cost functions described above.  However, for 
the ensuing analysis we focus on the effects that this type of parameter has on the competitive fringe and 
the dominant firm. 
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( )* ; 0fj fj fjq q p θ= ≥ ,  j = 1,....,J. 
For future reference, let * *f fjjq q=∑ . Since we assume identical firms comprise the 
competitive fringe, an aggregate fringe supply function may be written as, 
( )* ; 0f f fq q p θ= ≥         (2) 
where θf = θ1 =····= θJ.15  
Curvature conditions on cf  ensure that the fringe firm’s problem is concave, which in 
turn ensures the standard comparative static result of a non-downward sloping aggregate 
sequestration supply function. Also, for future reference, note that  
!!!∗!!! < 0 at an interior 
solution via total differentiation of the fringe firm’s Kuhn-Tucker condition and 
application of the curvature conditions on cf  with respect to both qf and θf  (the individual 
firm’s optimality condition is identical to the industry’s given the identical-firm 
assumption). In cases where the direct effect of θf  on fcʹ′  outweighs its indirect effect (via 
!!!∗!!!), the fringe firm’s Kuhn-Tucker condition also implies !"!!! > 0 in equilibrium, i.e., 
the equilibrium carbon price rises with a positive (i.e., upward) shift in the competitive 
fringe’s marginal cost curve. 
Further, an aggregate zero-profit condition for the competitive fringe may be 
expressed as, 
( ) *; 0* * * *f f f f f f= p q c q Fπ θ− − =        (3) 
                                                
15 We model the competitive fringe at the industry level in order to be consistent with the standard 
graphical analysis presented in Section 2, and thus to retain a focus on the relative market shares of the 
fringe as a whole and the dominant firm, rather than on sequestration per firm within the fringe. Modeling 
the competitive fringe in this way of course precludes us from explicitly addressing issues of entry and exit. 
These issues are instead considered implicitly. 
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where p* denotes the equilibrium carbon price and 𝐹!∗ is an implicit measure of the 
number of fringe firms in the industry (determined endogenously). Since it is uniquely 
determined by equation (3), a larger 𝐹!∗ implies that a larger aggregate licensing fee is 
incurred by the competitive fringe in equilibrium when Ffj  remains constant for all j, 
which in turn implies a larger number of firms now existing in the industry.16 
In the first stage, the dominant firm chooses its quantity of carbon sequestration, qd, 
to solve the long-run profit-maximization problem, 
( ) ( )Max ;
dq d d d d d d d
= p q q c q Fπ θ− −  
where cd is the dominant firm’s total sequestration cost (assumed positive and convex in 
qd) and θd is its associated cost parameter. As with the competitive fringe’s marginal 
sequestration cost, we assume the dominant firm’s marginal cost, cd, is positive in θd. 
Also, similar to Ff for the competitive fringe, Fd  is an endogenously determined, quasi-
fixed, one-time licensing fee verifying the transferability of the dominant firm’s 
sequestered carbon.17 
For simplicity, we assume the dominant firm’s licensing fee is proportional to the 
competitive fringe’s, e.g., as a pre-determined percentage, ν > 0, of 𝐹!∗.18  Thus, 𝐹!∗ = 𝑣𝐹!∗          (4) 
We make particular mention of the fact that in this problem p is a function of qd. In 
particular, p(qd) is the inverse of *pq  minus the inverse of 
*
fq ; i.e., in graphical terms the 
                                                
16 The need to solve for an explicit number of fringe firms is obviated by the model’s identical-firm 
assumption. Rather, the aggregate supply of sequestration is a sufficient characterization of the fringe at the 
level of abstraction assumed in this model. 
17 Assuming p is negative in qd, and given the curvature conditions on cd with respect to qd, the dominant 
firm’s problem is concave. 
18 We could of course assume completely separate licensing fee determination processes for the fringe and 
dominant firm. However, this would unnecessarily complicate the ensuing numerical analysis. 
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dominant firm recognizes that it faces residual demand curve Dr in Figure 2. In analytical 
terms, this recognition on the part of the dominant firm compels a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. 
The dominant firm’s Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition is, 
d dp q p cʹ′ ʹ′+ ≤  
resulting in the equilibrium amount of sequestration produced by the dominant firm 
( )* , 0d d dq q θ= ≥piq         (5) 
where piq is vector ( ),...,p1 pIq q . 
We note from equation (1) that a ceteris paribus increase in piq  increases polluter i’s 
demand for sequestration. This effectively causes the dominant firm’s restricted demand 
curve to shift outward, in turn causing a ceteris paribus non-decreasing amount of 
sequestration produced by the dominant firm. Also, given the curvature conditions 
mentioned above, total differentiation of the dominant firm’s Kuhn-Tucker condition (at 
an interior solution) results in !!!∗!!! < 0. Given a downward-sloping (residual) market 
demand curve facing the dominant firm, this in turn implies !!∗!!! > 0. 
Finally, an equilibrium clearing condition closes the model. 
* * *
p f d pq q q q≤ + + %.         (6) 
Equation (6) states that aggregate sequestration from the dominant firm and the 
competitive fringe, ** fd qq + , plus aggregate abatement from the polluting firms, *pq%, must 
be no less than aggregate statutorily required abatement, pq . Note that this equation also 
serves as a de facto market equilibrium condition, since it can be reduced to * * *p f dq q q≤ + , 
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which states that net sequestration demand from the polluting firms cannot exceed the 
aggregate amount of sequestration produced by the dominant firm and the competitive 
fringe. 
Equations (1) – (6) form a system of I + 5 equations that can be used to solve for the I 
+ 5 equilibrium variables ( )* * * * * *, , , , ,d f pi f dp q q q F F , i = 1,....,I.  In addition, a corresponding 
equilibrium profit level for the dominant firm, * 0dπ ≥ , can be calculated. 
For the numerical analysis of this model we assume, as in Section 2, the 
existence of two polluters, p1 and p2.19 Total sequestration costs for the dominant firm 
and the competitive fringe, as well as total abatement costs for the polluters, are each 
assumed quadratic.20  Specifically, 
2
2
d
d d d d
d
qc q Fα
ε
= + +
        (7a)
 
2
2
f
f f f f
f
q
c q Fα
ε
= + +
        (7b)
 
( )2pi pi pi pi pic q qα β= +% % ,  i = 1,2.       (7c) 
where cost parameters αd, αf, αpi, and βpi  and output elasticities εd and εf  are each greater 
than zero, i = 1,2 (the remaining variables were previously defined above).21  It is 
important to note that αpi in (7c) is not the vertical intercept of polluter i’s net 
sequestration supply curve, i.e., it is not equal to pi (from MCpi = Spi, i = 1,2) in Figure 2.  
                                                
19 The numerical simulations are performed using GAMS version 2.0.13. The input coding and output from 
these simulations are available from the editor of this journal. 
20 These functional forms are consistent with both Lubowski, et al. (2006) and Benitez, et al. (2007).  
Lubowski, et al. (2006) estimate a logistic aggregate supply (marginal cost) function, to which the linear 
marginal cost function of the quadratic specification provides a fairly close approximation.  Our linear 
marginal cost function also approximates quite closely the quadratic function estimated in Benitez, et al. 
(2007) over the majority of the range of carbon sequestration considered in that study.  
21 In relation to the theoretical model presented above, αd and εd are subsumed in θd and αf and εf are 
subsumed in θf. 
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The vertical intercept is instead 2pi pi piqα β+ , which is the first partial derivative of cpi 
evaluated at pi piq q=% , i.e., where qpi equals zero, i = 1,2.  
Initial values for each parameter in the model are presented in Table 1.  Note that 
these values distinguish polluter p2 as being high-cost (in terms of marginal abatement 
cost) relative to polluter p1. Polluter p2 is also high-cost relative to the dominant firm and 
the competitive fringe. However, the slope of polluter p1’s marginal cost curve (2βp1 = 
0.5) is less than the corresponding slope of the competitive fringe’s aggregate marginal 
cost ( 22f2/ε = ), while its vertical intercept (αp1 =0.015) is slightly larger (αf = 0.01). As 
in Figure 2, both the competitive fringe and polluter p1 are high-cost relative to the 
dominant firm. These relative costs reflect the underlying assumptions of the competitive 
fringe model, in particular that the dominant firm generally faces lower sequestration 
costs than the competitive fringe and the polluters, and the competitive fringe in turn 
faces lower cost than at least some of the polluters.22 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Since the demand curve facing the dominant firm has a total of three kink points (one 
each corresponding to the vertical intercepts of the marginal sequestration/abatement-
credit cost curves for the competitive fringe, αf, and the two polluters, αpi + 20βpi, i = 1,2)  
we run three separate constrained versions of the model: (i) p* ≤ αf, (ii) αf  <  p* ≤ αp1  + 
20βp1, and (iii) αp1 + 20βp1 <  p* < αp2 + 20βp2 (reference the residual demand curve Dr in 
Figure 2).  The version of the model associated with the highest profit for the dominant 
                                                
22 In order to focus attention on the role of divergent abatement cost structures, we also assume equivalent 
required abatement levels for the polluters, i.e., 10p2qp1q == . With respect to divergence in the cost 
structures, we emphasize that it is not the specific parameter values that matter for the numerical analysis, 
rather the relative costs that are reflected in these values.  
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firm then represents the equilibrium solution.  For this particular numerical analysis 
model version (iii) is associated with the dominant firm’s highest profit level.  This is the 
region of residual demand where the carbon price is least restricted on the upside. 
The first two cases under consideration assess the responsiveness of sequestration to 
changes in the relative cost structures of the dominant firm and competitive fringe. In 
Case 1 we introduce a step decrease (up to 10 separate steps) in the output elasticity 
parameter of the competitive fringe, εf.  The step decrease, µ, is a constant -0.11. Thus, in 
the first step εf decreases from one to 0.89, in the second step from 0.89 to 0.78, etc. 
These steps lead to progressively greater separation in costs between the competitive 
fringe, on the one hand, and both the dominant firm and polluters on the other.  In 
particular, the competitive fringe becomes progressively more high-cost relative to the 
dominant firm and the polluters (in terms of the rates of change in marginal sequestration 
costs). 
Alternatively, in Case 2 we introduce a constant step increase of µ = 0.11 (again, up 
to 10 separate steps) in the output elasticity parameter of the dominant firm, εd. Thus, in 
the first step εd increases from 1.2 to 1.31, in the second step from 1.31 to 1.42, etc. As a 
result, the dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost relative to the 
competitive fringe and the polluters. 
Finally, in Case 3 we introduce constant step increases of µ = 0.11 in the statutorily 
required abatement levels of both polluters, 𝑞!", i = 1,2. Thus, in the first step 𝑞!" 
increases from 10 to 10.11, in the second step from 10.11 to 10.22, etc., i = 1,2. As a 
result, both polluters face progressively stiffer regulatory standards. 
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4. Numerical Results 
Table 2 presents our numerical results based on the initial parameter values contained in 
Table 1. The second column in the table presents the benchmark equilibrium for the case 
of perfect competition, where the dominant firm does not exist and the sequestration 
market is therefore supplied solely by the competitive fringe (and any abatement credits 
contributed by the two polluters).23 The table’s third column presents results for the 
competitive fringe model (i.e., with the dominant firm included). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
We begin by noting that at these initial parameter values the competitive fringe 
produces slightly less sequestration in aggregate than the dominant firm, i.e.,
* *3.441 3.014d fq q= > = .  At the equilibrium price p
* = 6.039, polluter p1 supplies a 
positive amount of abatement credits ( *1 2.048pq = ), while polluter p2 demands the sum 
of these credits and the sequestration produced by the dominant firm and competitive 
fringe, i.e., *2 2 28.503 8.503p p pq q q− = ⇒ = −% . 
As expected, in relation to the competitive benchmark the competitive fringe’s 
equilibrium quantity of sequestration, as well as both polluters’ abatement efforts, all 
decrease in response to the presence of a dominant firm. The equilibrium carbon price 
also decreases, due to the combination of the dominant firm’s lower costs of 
sequestration and the restriction of the market demand curve (see Figure 2). The decrease 
                                                
23 The conception of perfect competition in the competitive fringe model is markedly different than in a 
monopoly model.  In a monopoly model, the monopolist’s marginal cost curve corresponds to (or is 
subsumed by) the industry’s marginal cost under perfect competition. To the contrary, in a competitive 
fringe model the fringe’s marginal cost curve (which is more steeply sloped than that of the dominant firm) 
becomes the sole cost curve in the market (and the market demand curve is no longer kinked). Figure 1 
illustrates this difference most clearly. In the monopoly model, perfect competition is identified by the 
intersection of the MCd and (lighter-shaded portion of the) D curves. In the competitive fringe model, the 
perfect-competition equilibrium occurs where the MCf and D curves intersect. The equilibrium carbon price 
in the competitive fringe model is therefore higher than in the traditional perfect competition model. 
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in the (endogenized) licensing fee for the competitive fringe, *fF , implies that in 
equilibrium the size of the fringe’s aggregate sequestration decreases in the presence of a 
dominant firm. 
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate how the initial equilibrium in the competitive fringe 
model changes for what we label as Case 1; changes that compel the competitive fringe 
to become progressively more high-cost relative to the dominant firm and the polluters. 
[INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE] 
In Figure 3, the competitive fringe reduces its aggregate (equilibrium) sequestration 
in response to the rise in production cost, in this case asymptotically to zero by the 10th 
step. Both the dominant firm and polluter p1 steadily increase their respective 
sequestration levels, with polluter p1 increasing its quantity supplied above the dominant 
firm’s by the sixth step. The competitive fringe’s equilibrium sequestration level falls at 
an increasing rate up to the sixth-step. Polluter p2’s net demand for sequestration also 
falls steadily, but at a slower rate than the dominant firm’s and polluter p1’s sequestration 
increases. 
Concomitant with these quantity changes, Figure 4 shows that the dominant firm’s 
profit increases at a decreasing rate with each step. The carbon price rises along with the 
dominant firm’s profit (and the gradual disappearance of the competitive fringe). This 
increase is driven by the fact that as the competitive fringe’s production cost rises, the 
dominant firm’s residual demand curve effectively shifts outward (in both regions pf-to-
p1 and p1-to-p2 in Figure 2). 
The policy implications of these results are twofold.  First, if the competitive fringe 
experiences declines in cost efficiency, say as a result of an increase in the opportunity 
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cost of land, the dominant firm’s market share vis-à-vis the fringe is, as expected,  likely 
to grow. Second, depending upon the polluting firms’ relative abatement efficiencies, it 
could be that lower-cost polluters gain market share as well.24 
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate how the initial equilibrium in the competitive fringe 
model changes for what we label as Case 2. These changes reflect a situation in which the 
dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost relative to the competitive fringe 
and the polluters. 
[INSERT FIGURES 5 AND 6 HERE] 
In Figure 5 we see that, unlike in Figure 3, these changes result in both the 
competitive fringe and low-cost polluter p1 losing market share to the dominant firm – 
the dominant firm and competitive fringe are sole suppliers of sequestration by the 10th 
step. Figure 6 shows that the carbon price falls as the dominant firm’s market share 
increases. This is a standard result, since the only change that has occurred in this case is 
a fall in the dominant firm’s marginal sequestration cost.  The residual demand curve has 
not shifted. 
In sum then, the way in which a wedge is driven between the cost efficiencies of the 
dominant firm and competitive fringe has important implications for the equilibrium 
allocation of sequestration and the corresponding carbon price. The same wedge can be 
associated with low-cost polluters gaining or losing market share and the carbon price 
rising or falling. 
                                                
24 “Market share” in this sense means proportion of aggregate sequestration/abatement supplied by either 
the dominant firm, competitive fringe, or the high- and low-cost polluter, whichever is in question.  
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Lastly, Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate how the initial equilibrium in the competitive 
fringe model changes for a third case. These changes reflect stricter regulatory standards 
enacted for both polluting firms.  
[INSERT FIGURES 7 AND 8 HERE] 
In Figure 7 we see that sequestration outputs rise for the dominant firm, competitive 
fringe, and low-cost polluter, but any changes in market share between these agents is 
miniscule. The high-cost polluter responds by producing less abatement, and therefore 
demanding more sequestration.  Figure 8 shows that these quantity changes are 
associated with a steady rise in the carbon price, the aggregate output of the competitive 
fringe, and dominant firm profit (although the rise in profit is much less pronounced in 
this case). Hence, any windfall from the change in regulatory standards is shared roughly 
equally by the dominant firm, competitive fringe, and low-cost polluter. 
 
5. Summary and Discussion 
This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration literature; a literature 
which has heretofore been focused on the empirical estimation of sequestration supply 
functions, both for specific countries and globally. The first contribution is to develop a 
theoretical framework within which the comparative statics of sequestration and permit 
trading may be jointly analyzed in the context of a competitive fringe model. An 
empirically based motivation for developing this framework is provided by Benitez, et al. 
(2007), who find that low-cost sequestration sites are mainly located in regions such as 
Sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern Brazil, and Southeast Asia. This suggests that the 
equilibrium emerging in a regional or global sequestration market may be governed more 
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by the interplay of a dominant firm (e.g., public land owned by a specific region or 
nation) and a competitive fringe (e.g., private land owned by U.S. farmers) than by 
perfect competition within a given nation (as assumed by Stavins,1999, and Lubowski, et 
al., 2006).  
The second contribution is to numerically analyze the competitive fringe/permit-
trading model. We have considered three cases. In the first two cases we assess the 
responsiveness of sequestration to changes in the relative cost structures of the dominant 
firm and competitive fringe. In Case 1, the equilibrium allocation of sequestration aligns 
with a higher carbon price in response to an increase in the competitive fringe’s marginal 
cost parameter. Conversely, in Case 2 the carbon price falls when the dominant firm 
experiences a decrease in its marginal cost parameter. Taken together, these results imply 
that how cost efficiencies change between the dominant firm and competitive fringe 
matters when it comes to predicting the corresponding direction of the equilibrium carbon 
price and changes in relative market shares (including the shares of the polluters 
themselves). 
In Case 3 we evaluate the impact of stricter regulation on the abatement decisions of 
the polluting firms. We find that respective increases in the polluting firms’ required 
abatement levels induce higher sequestration levels from both the dominant firm and 
competitive fringe, as well as from the low-cost polluter. The equilibrium carbon price 
rises as well. 
Of course numerical analysis based on ad hoc parameter values and functional forms 
is limited by its inability to inform policy with anything other than a more qualitative 
assessment of equilibrium allocations in a relative sense, e.g., by answering questions 
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such as how ‘smooth’ might be the disappearance of a competitive fringe as the dominant 
firm becomes more cost-effective in its production of sequestration, or vice-versa? Until 
the parameter values and functional forms themselves are empirically estimated and 
incorporated into the numerical analysis, the numerical model will be limited in its policy 
relevance. 
The current numerical analysis nevertheless offers some important caveats for 
policymakers. For example, the results for Cases 1 and 2 demonstrate that as the 
dominant firm becomes more cost-effective at producing sequestration relative to the 
competitive fringe the attendant effects on low-cost polluters and the carbon price are 
ambiguous – low-cost polluters may gain or lose market share in abatement and the 
equilibrium carbon price may rise or fall. In particular, if the cost-efficiency wedge 
between the competitive fringe and the dominant firm widens as a result of the 
competitive fringe experiencing a ceteris paribus rise in production costs (i.e., a reduction 
in cost effectiveness relative to the dominant firm), then the low-cost polluters gain 
market share and the equilibrium carbon price increases. To the contrary, if the wedge 
widens as a result of the dominant firm experiencing a ceteris paribus fall in production 
costs (i.e., an increase in cost effectiveness relative to the competitive fringe), the low-
cost polluters lose market share and the equilibrium carbon price decreases. To the extent 
that we care about these types of market share and pricing issues we therefore need to 
care about how the cost-efficiency wedge develops between the dominant firm and 
competitive fringe. Or, alternatively stated, we need to understand the equilibrium effects 
associated with policies that might create such a wedge. 
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Similarly, Case 3 demonstrates the effects of changes in regulatory standards on the 
polluters’ relative market shares and the equilibrium carbon price. To the extent that we 
care about these effects we therefore must concern ourselves with the way in which 
regulatory standards are adjusted. This paper’s numerical results suggest that uniform 
changes in standards, e.g., a uniform increase in required abatement across polluters in a 
permit market, may have starkly different effects on high- and low-cost polluters, but not 
as pronounced effects on their respective market shares as policies affecting the relative 
sequestration productivities of the dominant firm and competitive fringe. 
Of course, criticism against the ad hoc nature of numerical analysis can also be levied 
against what is effectively ad hoc empirical analysis. Until empirical analyses such as 
Stavins’ (1999), Lubowski, et al.’s (2006), and Benitez, et al.’s (2007) account for both 
the global nature of the carbon sequestration problem and the corresponding market 
structures that are most likely to govern the behavior of the various agents involved, 
estimates of what are inherently endogenous variables (e.g., the allocation of 
sequestration and abatement across these agents and the resulting equilibrium carbon 
price) will be biased estimates of the equilibrium outcomes themselves. 
Thus, the avenue for future research seems clear. Demand-side information should be 
incorporated into supply-side models. This information should be global in scale (or 
regional if carbon emissions are to be controlled via a set of region-based agreements a la 
Asheim, et al., 2006) and reflective of the prevailing market structure. Incorporation of 
this type of information into national supply-side models, such as those of Lubowski, et 
al. (2006) and Stavins (1999), will enhance the accuracy and reliability of supply 
estimates by reflecting what is a likely in the wider realm of a global equilibrium, 
 24 
than what is possible under the parochial assumptions of perfect competition. The same 
can be said for global supply-side models, such as Benitez, et al.’s (2007). 
With respect to the role that market structure might play in the allocation of 
sequestration and abatement on a global or regional scale, echoes can be heard of Hahn’s 
(1984) seminal article demonstrating the importance of market power in determining an 
equilibrium outcome. Without accounting for market structure, empirical predictions of 
equilibrium outcomes in sequestration and abatement markets are likely to be biased. 
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Figure 1. Standard Competitive Fringe Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Q
$
MRr
MCd
MCf=SfD
Dr
p1
p*
p2
qf* qd* Q*
f
d e
 28 
Figure 2. Competitive Fringe Model with Permit Trading. 
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Figure 3. Sequestration Quantities for Case 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Carbon Price, Dominant Firm Profit, and Fringe License Fees 
For Case 1. 
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Figure 5. Sequestration Quantities for Case 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Carbon Price, Dominant Firm Profit, and Fringe License Fees 
For Case 2. 
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Figure 7. Sequestration Quantities for Case 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Carbon Price, Dominant Firm Profit, and Fringe License Fees 
For Case 3. 
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Table 1. Initial Parameter Values for Numerical Analysis. 
 
Parameter Initial Value 
αd 0.009 
αf 0.01 
αp1 0.015 
αp2 0.05 
βp1 0.25 
βp2 2.0 
εd 1.2 
εf 1 
v 1.05 
1pq  10 
2pq  10 
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Table 2. Equilibrium Solutions Based on Initial Parameter Values. 
 
Variable Perfect Competition Competitive Fringe 
*
dq  --- 3.441 
*
fq  3.640 3.014 
*
1pq  4.550 2.048 
*
2pq  -8.190 -8.503 
p* 7.290 6.039 
*
dπ  --- 2.985 
*
sF  13.250 9.087 
 
